TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES AND GOVERN-MENTS AGAINST THE PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE OF Sará de Batáan

The government promised wealth to the small peasant farmers: all they had to do was mortgage their lands and associate themselves with a banana company. Unfortunately, that promise did not keep. When the banana company went bankrupt, it was the peasants of Sara de Bataan who had to carry the load. They almost lost everything.

In the mid 1980s, the government established the Atlantic Zone as a "Banana Zone". It directed financial and technical resources to promote the production of bananas for export, under the direction of private enterprise, both national and international.

Even though the region was inhabited by peasant farmers whose banana production supplied the national market, the success of the government plan depended on the exclusive production of export bananas. In order for the peasants to enter the Banana Plan, the government deemed it necessary to pressure them with promises of wealth or threats to take away their land.

In March of 1989, the majority of the peasants of Sara de Bataan decided to form part of the Banana Plan by associating themselves with the transnational company Uniban (whose place would later be assumed by the magnate Federico Gallegos). Only a dozen peasants remained out side of the negotiations, suspecting the plan was too risky and had few possibilities of benefitting them.

In earlier years, the peasants had received their land from the then called Institute of Lands and Colonization (ITCO), which today is called Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA) and maintains administrative responsibility of the lands and agricultural development of the zone. Since the 1960s, when the peasant farmers began to arrive, the policy was directed at helping the small producers. It promoted a peasant agriculture for self sufficiency and national markets.

The IDA would provide technical advice and fomented peasant fruit and wood production, among other forms of support. However, when the zone was designated for banana expansion, the government wished to redirect peasant production toward commercial banana production.

Forced Monoculture

In this context, an agreement was reached among the banana company, the IDA and the peasant farmers for the production and export of bananas. For their part, peasant far-mers agreed to dedicate their lands exclusively to banana production, sell the fruit only to the banana company, and place their land in mortgage in order to finance the project proportionately. The banana company agreed to buy the fruit from the peasant farmers and take charge of selling the fruit, provide salaries to participant peasant farmers and provide the necessary technical advice.

For its part, the IDA agreed to supervise the organization of the peasant farmers in associations of produ-cers, offer technical follow-up and infrastructure planning, provide land titles to the farmers who did not already have them, look for financing from lending organizations, and oversee the compliance with the tripartite contract.

The twelve farmers who decided not to participate were the only obstacle for the total monopoly of the banana company. They continued producing corn, beans, plantains for national consumption, which in their opinion were an adequate market. They also had reforested their small farms with wood trees and fruit trees, which required years to bear their benefits.

Intuitively, they implemented integrated agricultural systems orien-ted by their own experience with production and commercialization, and their knowledge of the ecological li-mits. They did not wish to lay bare their lands and dedicate them to banana monocultures. At the same time, they suspected that the government promises seemed to good to be true.

The The IDA, instrument of repression

The rejection of these farmers irritated the other farmers, and the government saw them as an obstacle to their Banana Plan. These farmers began to suffer a series of pressures and threats that tried to force them to join the contract. The most serious was when the IDA sent official letters threatening them with cancelling the adjudication of their lands if they did not enter the Banana Plan. According to the letter:

"(...) if it were necessary, measures would be taken in those cases of land owners who are not in accord with the establishment of banana production, with legal procedures, which we, as the Institution are authorized to apply, be it by procedures of nullifying land titles, or by the revocation of the adjudication of the lands (...) We hope, therefore, that you reconsider immediately your position, so that you may join us in consolida-ting this grand project in the short term. We reiterate that our only intention is to procure the well being of the small farmers and we are sure that with this productive project we will achieve this". (1)

The peasant farmers who did not wish to enter the plan called on the Parish of Bataan and its parishioner, Father Walter Marchena. With a telegram, Father Marchena asked the IDA to desist from pressuring the peasant farmers. "Leave them in peace and free to cultivate their lands," the priest requested. (2) With a lawyer provided by the Church, they analyzed the tripartite contract in order to understand the legal requirements of the contract. Based on this analysis, they reiterated their decision not to enter the Banana Plan, for being too risky.

The IDA began pressuring the Church. In a telegram directed to Father Marchena, the executive president of the IDA said:

"Sword, keep to your sheath, says a wise proverb. (...) We respect your inexpert criterion in this matter, but we do not share it. In the short term we will have the joy of seeing peasant farmers for the first time producing bananas and living under better conditions. Hopefully with the blessing of a Priest who is up to date on the agroindustrial systems Costa Rica is achieving. For this reason, I do not plan to, as you say: "Leave them in peace. Because the peace of the cemeteries is not what we want, while the men of my country have the strength to fight for Costa Rica". (3)

Justice is made

A short time later, the Church presented a Recourse of Unconstitutionality against the IDA in support of the pea-sant farmers and their lands. The verdict was favorable: the IDA could not take away their lands.

The fears of the twelve were well founded. By 1994, the company of Gallegos was in financial crisis. (La Nación, October 5th, 1994). The company could not carry out its obligations nor pay salaries or other benefits it owed the peasant farmers "partners" in the business. Itneither could respond to the Banco Popular, from which it had received financing for the company. (La Republica, March 4th, 1995). The indebted peasant partners also could not respond. The consequent conflicts between the peasant partners and the Gallegos company included strikes at the processing plant and the takeover of the plantation.

In these conflicts, the Church was also present. The Diocese Commission of the Social Pastorate asked the Ombudsman to obtain reliable information regarding the real situation of the company and that the Ministry of Labor intervene in the conflict. Father Gerardo Vargas, in representation of the Diocese of Limon, collaborated as mediator.

Consequences of the company offensive

Nevertheless, the future of the peasant farmers remained frustrated. In the midst of this uncertainty, many returned to peasant production as a means of survival. Some formed a cooperative to resume banana production, taking advantage of some banana farms and the processing plant. Others left the land.

For months the situation did not change. Many diverse negotiations on the part of the Church and the peasant farmers did not bear fruit. Finally, in June of 1996 the Banco Popular announced its intention of auctioning off the lands, claiming it had no alternative. Nevertheless, with the new negotiations of the Church and the grass roots organizations of the region, at the last minute the bank suspended the auction and asked the government to resolve the problem. A few weeks later, the government announced that it would cancel the debt of the peasant farmers had with the Banco Popular. The IDA would acquire the land to distribute it again among the same peasant farmers.

The promise of the IDA that "in the short term we will have the joy of seeing peasant farmers for the first time producing bananas and living under better conditions," was not kept at all. Moreover, the project completely failed. It only left a legacy of distrust, ecological destruction and poverty.

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Notes1. Letter to Jose Antonio Mesen Ortiz, January 5th, 1990 signed by Sergio Quiros Maroto, executive president of the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA). Photocopy filed by the Diocese Commission of the Social Pastorate, Siquirres, Limon.2. Telegram to Sergio Quiros Maroto from Walter Marchena, the 11th of December, 1989. Copy filed with the Diocese Commission of the Social Pastorate.3. Telegram from Sergio Quiros Maroto to Walter Marchena, December 22, 1989. Original filed by the Diocese Commission of the Social Pastorate.

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